Why has Southeast Asia, hardly a pacifist region in previous centuries, been so peaceful since 1991?
The end of the Cold War; regional cooperation in the form of ASEAN; economic progress; a new birth of democracy and liberty — all are valid explanations.
Yet one simpler reason is that most of the more serious sovereignty disputes, largely a hangover of colonialism, had been fought by then.
Rival claims over Borneo between Indonesia and Malaysia ended after the “confrontation” of 1963-1966.
Tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah — now part of Malaysia but which in previous centuries was administered by the Sultanate of Sulu, which the Philippines claims gives it authority — almost sparked a war when it formally joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963.
Manila broke off diplomatic relations and Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippine dictator, drew up plans to invade, although diplomatic relations later resumed without too many shots being fired.
What to do about Chinese-majority Singapore was settled when it was kicked out – or left, depending on whom one asks – of the Malaysian Federation in 1965.
On the mainland, the departure of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in the late 1980s and then Vietnamese-China peace terms in 1991 allowed all governments in the region to get on with properly drawing borders that had been scribbled and traded by French colonialists.
Even though 1991 was the year of the barbaric Santa Cruz massacre in Timor-Leste’s Dili, it was obvious at the time that Indonesia’s annexation of the former Portuguese colony couldn’t persist.
Although many of these territorial disputes were, at best, shelved rather than resolved, there was a spirit after 1991 that the more pressing concern of regional governments was making money, mutually if possible, rather than squabbling over scraps of land.
It helped that the rest of the world – particularly the United States and China – had more at stake in Southeast Asian peace after 1991 than in stirring sovereignty disputes to serve their own ends.
Worldwide irredentism
Alas, we’re now living in a new age of irredentism.
Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 on the premise that the Ukrainian nation doesn’t even exist and therefore should be re-annexed by Russia.
Beijing is risking World War Three in its pursuit of “reunifying” Taiwan.
Much of the Middle East warring today rests on 1st century claims of homelands.
South Korea and North Korea both have designs to incorporate the other half of the peninsula. Venezuela apparently wants to annex Guyana.
The latest fray in Southeast Asia is between Cambodia and Thailand over the island of Koh Kood/Koh Kut – although it’s actually about who controls a 27,000 sq.km area of the Gulf of Thailand that sits on natural gas reserves.
In early November, Thai Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai travelled to the island for a visit that served no purpose other than for Thailand to restate its ownership.
Conservative circles in Bangkok are stirring this trouble primarily to offend the coalition government now led by the Thaksin family, yet these things have a way of getting out of hand.
A few weeks ago, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet appealed for calm.
“One side claims their land is lost; the other says it isn’t. Why should we bring fire unnecessarily into our home? Acting rashly could provoke unnecessary conflict,” he said.
No doubt he has his own memories of having been a general when Cambodia and Thailand’s militaries came to blows in 2008 over the Preah Vihear Temple, a dispute that dates back to the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 that swapped territory between Cambodia and Thailand, including Koh Kood/Koh Kut.
Sabah tensions
Yet, while Hun Manet’s own dictatorial ruling party has managed to quiet just about anyone capable of an independent thought, it cannot keep the Cambodian people silent whenever they get the whiff of something that smells like territorial sellout.
Intense public pressure this year led to Phnom Penh quitting the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area in September.
The decision was taken solely to appease those who claimed that the rather trivial economic scheme was a violation of Cambodian sovereignty by Vietnam, the Cambodian nationalist’s bete noire.
Now, the same voices are pressuring the Cambodian government to be tough on Bangkok. Phnom Penh cannot simply wash its hands of a lame economic agreement to appease critics this time around.
Tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah are flaring again, as well.
In July 2020, the Philippines’ then-foreign minister, Teodoro Locsin Jr., tweeted in response to a U.S. government statement about sending aid to north Borneo: “Sabah is not in Malaysia if you want to have anything to do with the Philippines.”
Malaysia’s then-foreign minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, retorted: “This is an irresponsible statement that affects bilateral ties… Sabah is, and will always be, part of Malaysia.”
Tensions died down somewhat afterwards, yet Malaysia sent a protest note to the Philippines last month over two new maritime laws that Kuala Lumpur says encroaches upon the sovereignty of Sabah.
The leaders of both countries agreed this month not to discuss Sabah, which is perhaps better than them debating it, since Manila is aware that a 2011 Supreme Court ruling means the Philippines has not abandoned its claim and Malaysian political circles are increasingly touchy about sovereignty.
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‘Adventurous ideas’
In 2022, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, perhaps more in a spirit of making himself a nuisance than making a genuine suggestion, told supporters that Singapore should be returned to the state of Johor, which ran the city’s affairs before its independence.
K Shanmugam, Singapore’s home affairs minister, warned Mahathir this is “not a game.”
“It is serious business,” he said. “If you get a leader in Malaysia like Dr. Mahathir, adventurous ideas may be attempted.”
The 99-year-old Mahathir probably won’t return to political office, but in January the Malaysian government set up a royal commission to study why, in 2018, Mahathir’s administration ended its review of an International Court of Justice ruling ten years earlier that awarded sovereignty of Pedra Branca island to Singapore.
On Dec. 5, the royal commission delivered a damning 217-page report that recommended a criminal investigation into Mahathir over his failure when premier to protect and defend Malaysia’s sovereignty.
Likely to stir up tensions with Singapore once again, the commission also ruled that “Malaysia has an arguable case” for claiming sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
Presumably, if Mahathir should be held criminally liable for not having asserted Malaysia’s claim in the past, as the commission argued, then Anwar Ibrahim, the current prime minister, now has a legal duty to reassert his country’s claims.
One might also add that this year has again seen tensions over who controls certain hamlets – mainly Naktuka – in Timor-Leste’s Oecusse enclave, which sits in the middle of West Timor, an Indonesian province.
Dili can be forgiven for nervousness after seeing Prabowo Subianto elected Indonesia’s president this year. Subianto was head of the Kopassus special forces that committed war crimes after Indonesia invaded and annexed Timor-Leste in 1975.
What seems to be driving all of this are the South China Sea disputes, which have forced every claimant government to think in terms of territorial competition.
China’s irredentist “nine-dash line” has naturally compelled governments in the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and increasingly Indonesia to restate their opinions almost weekly on what territory they possess.
Amid this scramble to assert and reassert one’s territorial claims, it isn’t surprising that voices have grown louder about reclaiming other lost lands.
Such things tend to snowball.
David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.